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THE SYMBOLISM AND SUBSTANCE OF
REDRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION
Natsu Taylor Saito*
The interplay of symbolism and substance in redress and reconstruction
is the broad topic I would like to address as we open this conference on
reparations and reconstruction in the new century, and I would like to start
with the importance of speaking truth. Not speaking truth to some power
out there, but speaking truth to ourselves, for if we believe that power resides
in the people, then we have both the power and the responsibility to change
that which we know is wrong.1
Speaking truth begins with a willingness to call things by their proper
names, and in the context of redress and reparations, the first thing we must
name is the wrong. Many of us here focus our energies on obtaining redress
through various legal systems, for the law promises a remedy for every
wrong. But, at least in the United States, in our discussions about
reparations we have been too quick to jump to debates about the remedy -
who should get what, and when - before we have specifically identified the
wrong for which we seek a remedy.2
A theme of this plenary is what we can learn from South Africa's Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In identifying the wrongs it would
address, the TRC limited its inquiry to gross violations of human rights
committed between 1960 and 1994.3 With respect to these wrongs, the TRC
had two major goals: The first was to "out" the truth. This was the primary
*©2001 by Natsu Taylor Saito, Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. Special
thanks to Penny Andrews and Wendy Stoffels for organizing this conference, to Akilah Jenga for
her support of and participation in my work and this conference, and to Kelly Jordan and Andi
Curcio for their comments. This was originally presented in the opening plenary of INTO THE
21ST CENTURY: A CONFERENCE ON REPARATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIOn, in Capetown, South
Africa in January 2001.
1 Noam Chomsky says, "It has been said that I dare to speak truth to power. Maybe so, but
that's never been my objective. My job... is to speak the truth to the great mass of people
without political or economic power... I take this as my task out of a firm conviction that
knowledge of the truth is itself empowering." Quoted in WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIES OF THE
MASTER RACE: LITERATURE, CINEMA AND THE COLONIZATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS (1998) at ix.
2 See, eg. Forun: Making the Case for Racial Reparations, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 2000, at 37
(interviewing "four of the country's most successful class-action lawyers to strategize about how
to bring America's most peculiar sorrow into a court of law").
3 See generally, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, vols. 1-
5 (1998) [hereinafter, TRC REPORT]; DESMOND TUTu, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999);
Albie Sachs, Truth and Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1563 (1999).
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justification for individual amnesties, conditioned on full disclosure, and for
an emphasis on obtaining the stories of the victims through testimony
provided to the Human Rights Violations Committee. 4
The TRC's second goal was to provide redress, through the Reparation
and Rehabilitation Committee. This goal, while never adequately
compensating the victims, would, in the words of former Justice Minister
Abdullah Omar, "restore the dignity of victims, the dignity of communities,
and ultimately, the dignity of the nation as a whole."5 While presenting a
daunting task, these goals are nonetheless fairly clearly defined and
somewhat limited in scope. One can, at least, point to a concrete wrong and
debate the effectiveness of the remedy.
From my very limited observations here in Capetown, it seems that part
of the problem South Africa still faces is that while the TRC was quite clear in
acknowledging its mandate and its limited capacity, observers both inside
and outside South Africa hoped it would do more. That it would respond
not only to all the injustices of nearly fifty years of apartheid, but those
created by centuries of colonial rule, with its legacy of genocide,
enslavement, confiscation of land, and exploitation of natural resources and
human labor.6 Two things that we learn from the work of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission are the importance of clearly identifying the
wrong being redressed, and the importance of not acting as if all other
wrongs have been remedied in the process. 7
Recent discussions of redress in the United States have focused on
reparations for African Americans.8 In this context, we often assume that we
know what the wrong is. Of course, it is slavery and racism, but we rarely
4 See Hon. Abdullah Omar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Accounting for the Past, 4
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L REV. 5, 8 (1998) (explaining the purpose of the three subcommittees of the
TRC).
5 Id., at 11.
6 For a summary of this history, see generally, 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
7 For a discussion of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the broader context of
South Africa's efforts to create institutions explicitly incorporating human rights norms, see
Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa; The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 63 (1997).
8 See generally, Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone; Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429 (1998) (oint issue); RANDALL
ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); ROY L. BROOKS, ed., WHEN SORRY
ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE
(1999).
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examine these concepts to see if we are, in fact, talking about the same
wrongs. For example, I often find myself in conversation with people who
assume that the wrong of slavery was racism. There is a real reluctance to
dissect what specifically was wrong with that brutally inhuman system of
economic exploitation which not only used and perpetuated racism, but
determined so much of our current hierarchies of power and privilege. One
reason for this is that it is much easier to condemn racism than it is to find
agreement on what is actually wrong with exploitative economic relations.
Where would we stop?
The desire to focus narrowly on race in the United States and to avoid
the complications of economic relations is, in part, what led us down the
limited, perhaps dead-end, path of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
jurisprudence.9 This path has led us to attempt to right the wrongs of
slavery and institutionalized racism through "equal protection" and "equal
opportunity."1 0 But the "wrong" of slavery was much bigger than the
slavemaster's failure to enslave in a colorblind manner, and it is cruelly
cynical to talk of equal opportunity in a world where color-coded structures
of power and privilege are so firmly entrenched. We can see here in South
Africa that dismantling apartheid, in its legal form anyway, does not provide
real opportunities to the residents of the shanty towns that surround Cape
Town. The same is true, if somewhat more veiled, for us in the United
States.
To have a meaningful discussion of reparations for African Americans,
we must start, I believe, with an honest discussion of the wrongs. Within the
U.S. legal system, perhaps this would mean starting with the Thirteenth
Amendment, which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude,11 to
9 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution says, in part:
... No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV (1868). See generally, Boris I. Bittker & Roy L Brooks, The
Constitutionality of Black Reparations in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 374.
10 For critiques of "equal rights" jurisprudence, see generally, Angela P. Harris, Equality
Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923 (2000); Lisa
M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection of Plessy: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence in the Resegregation of
Ameria's Schools, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999); Alan Freeman, Rights and The Quest for
Equality of Oopportunity; A CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 295 (1988); Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, reprinted in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT 29, 30 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
11 The Thirteenth Amendment reads in full:
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develop a jurisprudence of the legacy of slavery - social, political and
economic.12 Perhaps it would force us to acknowledge the history which
takes us quite seamlessly from slavery to the use of convict labor and the
expansion of the "criminal justice" system13 to current racial disparities in
incarceration rates and the oft-discussed "criminalization" of being black and
male in America today.14
Reparations, by definition, relate to the past for they are designed to
remedy wrongs that have already occurred. But I believe that what we care
most about are the injustices and inequities we see around us today. We do
not seek retribution, but a decent life for those in our communities, however
broadly we define those. Thus, as we begin a truthful discussion of the
wrongs suffered by African Americans we will move, inevitably, from
narrow views of the wrongs and the remedies to a broader discussion of how
current structures of social, political and economic power have emerged
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. Const., Amend. XIII (1865). Attempts to use the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate
discriminatory practices have generally been unsuccessful. See, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1897) (upholding the policy of "separate but equal" and dismissing plaintiffs attempt to
have Louisiana's policy of segregating railroad cars struck down as a "badge of servitude.")
12 A good start might be to analyze current social, political and economic structures in the
terms of Higginbotham's "ten precepts of American slavery jurisprudence" (which he explicates
in terms of inferiority, property, powerlessness, racial "purity," manumission and free blacks,
family, education and culture, religion, liberty, and "by any means possible"). See A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence: Chief Justice Roger Taney's
Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1695 (1996).
13 On the history of convict labor and its relationship to slavery, see generally, DAVID
OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTiCe
(1996); MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH, 1866-1928 (1996); ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICr LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996).
14 See generally, JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996) (noting the disparate impact of current trends in criminal
justice and the crime control industry on African American men); MARC MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE (1999) (the Sentencing Project's critique of current criminal justice policies that
result in the incarceration of nearly one in three black men); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME
AND THE LAW (1997) (generally addressing the history of racial disparities in law enforcement).
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from those wrongs, and how we can now change those structures to make
them more equitable.15
But before we consider dividing up the pie of American wealth and
resources, in the interest of honesty about the wrongs, and to fashion
principled remedies, we must be willing to question the legitimacy of the pie
itself. Just where does this pie come from? And from whose apples was it
made?
Slavery is a tremendously important source of the contemporary wealth
of the United States.1 6 However, a further enquiry would entail an analysis
of the United States' history as a settler/colonialist regime. This means
assessing at least two other major issues. First, we have to take seriously the
claims of indigenous peoples to the land, much of which, even under
currently acknowledged treaties is illegally occupied by the United States.17
Second, we have to acknowledge the extent to which the wealth we want
more equitably distributed comes from the expropriation of the labor and
natural resources of the rest of the world.18
I take us down this path of ever-expanding injustices not to say that we
need to fix all of the world's inequities at once, but to urge us to be brutally
honest - with ourselves, first of all - in identifying the wrongs we are
addressing and ensuring that the redress we struggle for takes us toward our
broader goals of social and economic reconstruction. I say this because I
15 See generally, Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
16 See generally, Donald Acquinas Lancaster, Jr., The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States
of America's Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis of
African American Reparations, 43 How. L J. 171 (2000).
17 See generally, WARD CHURCHILL, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN
RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION (1999); Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred
Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000);
Anthony Peirson Xavier Bothwell, We Live on Their Land: Implications of Long-Ago Takings of
Native American Indian Property, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 175 (2000); Nell Jessup Newton,
Compensation, Reparations, and Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L.
REV. 454 (1994).
18 These issues are addressed in contexts far too numerous to cite here. For a few
examples, see generally, International Law and the Developing World: A Millennial Analysis, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 595 (2000); Obijiofor Aginam, Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap and Global
Health Challenges at Century's Dawn, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 603 (2000); Penelope E.
Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 373 (2000); Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women
in the Maquiladoras, Latina Critical Legal Theory and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 729 (2000).
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believe that every movement to obtain reparations contains within it both the
potential to further other struggles for justice and the potential to reinforce
existing structures of power and privilege.19
The experience of the Japanese American community in obtaining
redress for its internment during World War II provides us with a
microcosm which illustrates both of these possibilities. In the case of redress
for Japanese Americans, it looks as if the wrong has been identified clearly
enough: the wartime imprisonment and confiscation of the property of
nearly 120,000 people, over 70% of them U.S. citizens by birth, on the basis of
their race and national origin, with no regard for due process of law.20 The
redress provided was clearly symbolic. It consisted of an apology, $20,000
cash payments to surviving internees, and a fund for public education. 21
However, it was symbolism that meant a great deal to the affected
community. The movement for redress culminated in an acknowledgment
of the suffering, which allowed for much-needed psychic healing and laid
the groundwork for important educational work.
Many of my generation (the children of internees) were initially quite
skeptical of the redress movement. We did not see how any token payment
made by the government could possibly compensate our parents and
grandparents for the trauma and losses that forever scarred their lives. Most
of us, however, came to appreciate the importance of truth-telling, of public
acknowledgment and apology, and of symbolic reparations. What we were
not vigilant enough about was the symbolic meaning of these reparations on
a larger scale.
Chris lijima has written a wonderful piece examining the extent to which
Japanese American redress, rather than righting wrong, has been positioned
19 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American
Claims, 40 B.C. L REv. 477, 487-501; 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 487-501 (1998)
(acknowledging the "potential underside of reparations" and the need for "careful strategic
framing of debate and action and anticipatory grappling with a reparations movement's both
bright and darker potential").
20 On the internment generally, see MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1996); for what is still arguably the best analysis of the
"wrong" see Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945).
21 These were provided for by the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat
903 (1988) (codified at 50 app. U.S.C. § 1989). Educational projects were supported by the Civil
Liberties Public Education Fund, established by the Act.
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to reward accommodation to wrong.22 He points out how the congressional
debates on the redress legislation emphasized why redress should be
granted: the "superpatriotism" of the Japanese American community and its
willingness to co-operate with and accommodate injustice. It is the Japanese
American community's "loyalty" that is praised, never the resisters who had
the courage to call the wrong what it was. 23 Yet, if the wrong is really being
redressed, shouldn't they be the heroes?
We see, in fact, that there has been very little attempt to call the wrong
by its true name. Instead, it is generally referred to as a "mistake," caused by
"wartime hysteria" and racial prejudice.24 There is no recognition that this
was not an aberration in the stream of Asian American history;25 and thus
no recognition that it could happen again. We are, for example, quite
oblivious to the parallels that exist with respect to the treatment of Arab
Americans today.26
We are thus, as Japanese Americans, still contesting the symbolism of the
redress received by our community. This is, I believe, an illustration of how
important it is in our broader discussions of reparations and reconstruction,
to focus on what direction we're taking, and how we wish to use the power
we hold to transform our societies. This is particularly true with respect to
reparations for African Americans.
We have seen how the Truth and Reconciliation Commission narrowly
defined the scope of the wrongs it would address, and how the reconciliation
it hopes to achieve is, at best, the first step on a long road to de-constructing
the hierarchies of power and privilege created by centuries of colonial rule.
22 Chris K. Jijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence; The Necessity
to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 385, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385
(1998).
23 Id. at 396-410.
24 This perspective is reflected in the report of the Congressional Commission appointed to
study the internment, which concluded that a "grave injustice" was suffered by Japanese
Americans as a result of "race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership."
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982); see also PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 361 (1999).
25 See generally, Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Functions of "Foreignness"
in the Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71 (1997); Keith Aoki, No Right to
Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37,
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 37 (1998).
26 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege; Japanese American Redress and the Racing of
Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L. J. 1 (2001).
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Similarly, any apologies, token payments to individuals or groups, or
programs instituted by the government to redress the legacy of slavery must
be seen as small steps in a long process of social reconstruction. They are not
"solutions," for if they are perceived as resolving the problem, they will
simply serve to reinforce existing structures of inequality and exploitation.
We must always ask, as we struggle for compensation, for reparations,
and for the reconstruction of our societies, whether we are struggling in
ways that support accommodation to and reconciliation with wrong, or
whether we are honoring resistance to wrong and participating in the
dismantling of the broader structures of oppression. What is the symbolism
of the redress we pursue, and what kind of society are we, in fact,
constructing?
